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ABSTRACT 
Contemporary moral philosophy has different approaches to provide justice and equality to groups that 
are traditionally discriminated on the grounds of  gender, religion, age, sexual orientation, etc. On the other 
hand, functionally diverse (disabled) people have had a parallel approach to their discrimination, excluded 
from mainstream diversities. Including functional diversity and the diversity model in modern recognition 
and redistribution theories, as another human diversity, provides an extended ethical approach: diversity 
ethics. This general framework also includes other fundamental ideas for equality such as human fragility, 
social domination logics, self-respect and auto-recognition. Diversity ethics provides sound foundations to 
defend justice and equality for all human diversities and an alternative to other approaches that broaden the 
moral community, excluding some humans, like Peter Singer’s ethics. 
KEYWORDS 
Diversity, moral community, justice, equality, recognition, redistribution, self-respect, dignity, functional 
diversity, disability, capabilities, Peter Singer. 
RESUMEN 
La filosofía contemporánea moral tiene diferentes enfoques para proporcionar justicia e igualdad a los 
grupos tradicionalmente discriminados por razón de género, religión, edad, orientación sexual, etc. Por otra 
parte, las personas con diversidad funcional (discapacidad) han tenido un enfoque paralelo a su 
discriminación, y han sido excluidas de las aproximaciones generales a la diversidad. La inclusión de la 
diversidad funcional y el modelo de la diversidad en las teorías modernas del reconocimiento y la 
redistribución, como otra diversidad humana más, genera un enfoque ético ampliado: la ética de la 
diversidad. Este marco general también incorpora otras ideas fundamentales para la igualdad, como la 
fragilidad humana, la lógica social de la dominación, la autoestima y el auto-reconocimiento. La ética de la 
diversidad proporciona fundamentos sólidos para defender la justicia y la igualdad de todas las diversidades 
humanas y una alternativa a otros enfoques que amplían la comunidad moral, excluyendo a algunos seres 
humanos, como la ética de Peter Singer. 
PALABRAS CLAVE 
Diversidad, comunidad moral, justicia, igualdad, reconocimiento, redistribución, autoestima, dignidad, 
diversidad funcional, discapacidad, capacidades, Peter Singer. 
 
RÉSUMÉ  
                                                
1 Publisher in Dilemata (Internacional Review of  Applied Ethics), 2010, n° 3, p. 95-116. [ISSN: 1989-7022]. Available at: 
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2 Note on language use. Authors usually write articles and use bibliography in their native languages: French and 
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La philosophie morale contemporaine propose des approches diverses de la discrimination des minorités. 
Pour une autre part, les personnes « fonctionnellement différentes » ou « fonctionnellement diverses » (i.e. 
handicapées) ont proposé une approche parallèle des discriminations qu’elles subissent. L’article vise à 
introduire la diversité fonctionnelle dans les théories modernes de la reconnaissance et de la redistribution 
afin d’apporter une perspective éthique élargie que l’on baptisera « éthique de la diversité ». Ce cadre 
général inclut d’autres dimensions fondamentales comme la fragilité humaine, la prise en compte des 
logiques de la domination, le respect et l’estime de soi. L’éthique de la diversité apporte les fondements d’une 
défense de la justice et de l’égalité pour l’ensemble de la diversité humaine et constitue une alternative à 
d’autres approches éthiques, comme celle de Peter Singer, prétendant élargir le champ de la communauté 
morale. 
MOTS CLÉS 
Diversité, communauté morale, justice, égalité, reconnaissance, redistribution, respect de soi, dignité, 
diversité fonctionnelle, handicap, capacités, Peter Singer. 
 
* 
* * 
1. Introduction 
Societies have been coping with human diversity for centuries, and have developed moral 
foundations to provide different people or groups of  people with equality in rights and treatment, 
specially during the past 50 years, in which several social movements have raised voice against 
discrimination demanding equality, and several human rights conventions have been approved to 
protect children, woman, migrants, indigenous, functional diverse3 (disabled) people, etc.  
These moral approaches have been incorporating all human, and even non human diversities, 
and have sometimes divergent conclusions and proposals. 
In this text we will try to provide a new proposal, based on recognition and redistribution 
theories, that will include the last part of  diversity to join the equality struggle: functional diversity, 
most known as disability. Some authors have developed interesting ideas and foundations in that 
field that could provide a wider range of  ideas to face fields as human fragility, auto-recognition of 
diversity and bioethics. 
In this proposal diversity ethics is explained and structured, and it will be used to overcome 
ethical approaches oriented to include non humans in the moral community, excluding some 
humans that are part of  human diversity: Peter Singers’ ethics.  
Peter Singer presented as a major philosophical innovation his apprehension and his justification 
of  what we should understand today as the ethical pertinent limits of  the moral community. He 
proposes an extension towards the animal species. Indeed, Peter Singer takes as a starting point the 
premise that traditionally humanists have drawn the line between animals and human beings, 
developing an speciesism that has been disrespectful with animals. His position, at least an 
innovation in philosophy, is to include non-human beings in the moral community and exclude 
certain entities previously considered as part of  it, such as “embryos, fetus or comatose individual”. 
                                                
3 The term “functional diversity” as a substitute of  “disability” was first proposed by Romañach and Lobato, (2005) and 
it is a part of  the diversity model (Palacios and Romañach, 2006, 2007). It should be noted that it is the first non-negative 
description on this reality that evades the ability concept. 
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This new drawing of  moral community boundaries, in which we would have duties, would allow 
dealing with ethical dilemmas, in particular in the medical field, bypassing our Judeo-Christian 
heritage, making us sensitive to the respect of  human life at any development level it is considered. It 
is indeed about breaking with the so-called doctrine of  the sanctity of  human life. The perspective 
offered by Singer could be an attractive way to solve some of  the moral dilemmas, particularly those 
raised by new medical technologies. 
In this text, we will show, first, that diversity ethics is a more robust extension of  the limits of  
moral community than the one Singer wishes to sustain. Second, we will show the limits and 
inherent contradictions in the approach advocated by Singer, placing ourselves in the same point of  
view he does, e.g. adopting a pragmatic and consequentialist approach. Finally bioethical positions 
based on diversity ethics will be described.  
2. Issues on diversity and humanity 
Humanity is conformed by diversity, in the same way nature is full of  diversity4. There is almost 
no human being genetically equal to another, with the rare exception of  some twins. In the 
biological sense there are different races, different genders, different abilities and ways of  
functioning, sexual orientations, and a human being is different in different ages, etc. 
In a social sense, that is, as a consequence of  the social construction through history, some other 
differences have been built between groups of  human beings: religion, culture, language, country of 
birth, wealth, class, etc. 
The first group of  diversities is inherent to humanity, and the second is inherent to social 
development in different parts of  the planet. 
Both types of  diversities have historically led to inequality, fear, slavery, injustice, discrimination, 
wars and oppression, as diversity has never been fully accepted in societies through history. But, fear 
of  diversity can have, despite human social behaviour roots, also philosophical roots: “Political 
theorist Arlene Saxonhouse (1992) traces the fear of  diversity in Western thought to the pre-
Socratics.” (Jakobsen, 1998, 4). 
3. Ethics and diversity 
Rousseau was the precursor of  the efforts that have been developed since the Enlightenment, 
back in the XVIIIth century to outline injustice, facing the fact that inequality, and therefore 
diversity, exists in human nature but needs not lead to social inequality in access to justice and 
freedom. 
“…instead of  destroying natural inequality, the fundamental compact substitutes, for such 
physical inequality as nature may have set up between men, an equality that is moral and 
legitimate, and that men, who may be unequal in strength or intelligence, become every one 
equal by convention and legal right.” (Rousseau, 1762, chapter 9). 
However, it was mainly in the XXth and XXIst century when different types of  human diversity 
have been approached by different authors, in search of  an ethic foundation that would provide 
justice, equality and freedom to society. In the past, “the promise of  enlightenment ethics was that 
conflict, specifically the interreligious conflict sparked by the Reformation, could be resolved while 
                                                
4 According to Synopsis and classification of living about 1.4 million living species of all kinds of organisms have been 
described. 
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maintaining universal respect for diversity. The light of  reason, a reason supposedly universal to all 
humanity, was to fulfil this promise. Thus, reason was thought to provide the key to maintaining a 
unified moral framework which could both respect and contain diversity.” (Jakobsen, 1998, 4).  
Unfortunately, the interreligious conflict remained, and remains even today, and justice did not 
arrive to different groups, such as women or people from different race, functionally diverse 
(disabled) people, etc. These groups started, in different stages of  history, their own search for ethical 
grounds that could bring justice and equality to their people and philosophical background to their 
political struggles.  
Unfortunately, these approaches have always been developed to provide rational and political 
basis orientated to a determined discriminated and/or oppressed group. Usually these groups would 
ignore, both in the political and in the ethical field, the rest of  diversities within society, and even the 
rest of  diversities within the group, reproducing a uniform simple group pattern, ignoring their own 
complexity5. 
In that way, concerning feminism: 
“The past several decades have seen repeated challenges to dominative feminist theories 
and practices which would deny the diversity and complexity of  those women who are 
subject of  feminist movement(s). Women of  color, lesbians, poor and working-class women, 
Jewish women, "Third World women," sex radicals, disabled woman… (this list can never be 
completed) have repeatedly challenged theoretical and political practices which would 
narrow the focus of  feminism and reinscribe social structural limitations along the lines of  
race, sexuality, class, religion, ability… (Beck 1982, Moraga and Anzaldúa 1981, Lorde 
1984, Samis 1987, Zandy 1990, Mohanty et al. 1991, Eiesland 1994).” (Jakobsen, 1998, 1). 
Centuries after the Enlightment, efforts have also been developed to bring together the different 
religious approaches. “In the last decade, there have been a number of  interesting attempts to 
formulate a global ethic. These attempts were initiated by ecumenical religious leaders, but have 
subsequently made their way into more general discourse, especially with the people within the 
United Nations.” (Struhl, 2006, 13). In this effort an attempt was made to join cultural, race and 
religious diversities. The result of  this effort is the “Declaration toward a Global Ethic”, whose 
principles are: 
“I. No new global order without a new global ethic 
II. A fundamental demand: Every human being must be treated humanely 
III.  Irrevocable directives  
1. Commitment to a Culture of  Non-violence and Respect for Life 
2. Commitment to a Culture of  Solidarity and a Just Economic Order 
3. Commitment to a Culture of  Tolerance and a Life of  Truthfulness  
4. Commitment to a Culture of  Equal Rights and Partnership Between Men and 
Women  
                                                
5 Nevertheless, the will to defend a minority group does not necessarily lead to biased and unilateral proposals, focused 
exclusively on the rights or interests of  particular groups, but it is also useful to develop comprehensive conceptual 
approaches that would consider each minority group in its specificity and diversity. 
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IV. Transformation of  Consciousness”. (Global Ethic Foundation, 1993). 
But, as it can be observed by prior references and ideas, a part of  human diversity has usually 
been left out: functional diversity. Even though it is clearly “one of  many areas in which true 
equality requires not identical treatment, but rather differential treatment in order to accommodate 
differential social needs”. (Kymlicka, 1992, 113). 
As another human diversity in struggle for equality, during the last decades, theoretical work has 
been developed around this group, especially by British sociologists like Colin Barnes, Geof  Mercer 
and Tom Shakespeare6, and by moral philosophers such as Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. 
Despite these theoretical efforts, insufficient attention has been devoted to functional diversity 
compared to other minorities such as women or religious minorities, and is still not considered as a 
part of  human diversity issues in most fields, probably on the grounds of  a quite simple issue: it’s 
been studied and named as an ability issue, weakly related to human diversity, as the “disability” word 
clearly indicates. 
Only since 2006, in Spain and mostly in Spanish, this issue has had a clear diversity approach 
with what is called the diversity model or approach. This model has been developed in two books an 
several articles related to different fields such as anthropology, sociology, bioethics, social work, law, 
moral and science philosophy, feminism, etc. by different authors from Spain and Argentina, like 
Miguel Ferreira, Mario Toboso, Soledad Arnau, Francisco Guzmán, Agustina Palacios, Carolina 
Ferrante, Manuel Lobato, Javier Romañach, Antonio Iañez, etc. 
3.1 Functional diversity (disability) and the diversity approach. A 
choice for our future society. 
Functional diversity activists have turned to bioethics in search of  theoretical models based on 
clear rational grounds that would provide answers to bioethical challenges around functional 
diversity. Those activists also know that “the best examples of  debates about moral issues that are in 
need of  clarification and rigor that a philosopher can provide occur in the field of  medical ethics” 
(Singer, 2002, 68). 
The result of  this activity had as an outcome the diversity model or approach. This approach was 
used to establish bioethics positions on issues related to the functional diversity in a second book: 
“Bioethics at the other side of  the looking glass”.7 
The diversity model is an extension or evolution of  the social model of  disability. The social model8 was 
based on US Independent Living movement’s ideas (Shapiro, 1994), can be traced to Michael 
Oliver (1983) and was – and keeps being – developed by British sociologists like Colin Barnes, Geof 
Mercer and Tom Shakespeare (Barnes, Mercer, Shakespeare, 1999). 
As it had happened before, the new model is also based in “…the problem of  obligations to our 
future generations, it undermined the assumption that a moral community can consist only of  
members who are in one time or era” (Singer, 2002, 130). 
Knowing that nowadays society discriminates on the grounds of  functional diversity (Palacios and 
                                                
6 Recently, some Spanish and Argentinean sociologists have also developed work in this field (see Romañach et al., 
2009).  
7 There is only a Spanish version, as the book has not yet been translated to English (Romañach, 2009). 
8 The social model ideas have also been included in the UN Convention of  the rights of  persons with disabilities. 
UNITED NATIONS (2006). “Convention on the Rights of  Persons with Disabilities” 
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Romañach, 2006, 55-99), the model states that a choice has to made concerning the kind of  society 
we want to have in the future: “…it’s a task projected to give the same value to all human beings 
that will exist in it [the world] in the future” (Romañach, 2009, 59). Do we want a future non-
discriminatory society in which every individual no matter how capable, or smart, or productive, or 
skilled, or able to run and walk able to speak, or able to hear, etc. has a chance to live and enjoy life 
at any age? Or do we want a discriminatory society in which only people who are useful, capable, 
smart, skilled, with good sight and hearing, etc. will be welcome and allowed to live and enjoy what 
society provides? 
The way we and our descendents will live in the future, depends on how we see each other today. 
It depends on the concept we have of  what a human being is today, and if  we want to select or not 
the human beings that will be allowed to join us in the future. It also depends on whether we want 
to be welcome in our society as we grow old or have an accident. 
The diversity model makes a clear choice: actions must be taken today in order to have a future 
society in which every human being will be welcome and has a chance to enjoy what life in society 
can provide. And enjoying that life means providing equal opportunities to everyone, so we may live 
the life we want to live, regardless of  our physical condition, in the absence of  arbitrary external 
social restrictions. 
This clear choice is not present in prior approaches, because functional diversity has never been 
considered a part of  diversity in moral philosophy, as all attempts to include it (Nussbaum, Sen) 
where done without the certainty that functional diversity is inherent to humanity and is not a 
medical, but a social issue.  
In a first approach, this might be seen as a limited struggle of  a few individuals9 who want to stop 
being discriminated and have equal opportunities in an oppressive society which nowadays is not 
constructed to fully accept human diversity. 
As an example, accessibility to the environment and buildings in modern developed countries is 
seen as a demand of  the approximately 2% of  the population who actually use wheelchairs. But the 
diversity approach provides a different way to perceive the same reality. In developed countries, 
100% of  the babies are carried around in strollers and is an important chance that anyone in their 
20s today will be using a wheelchair if  he or she reaches the age of  90. 
Considering it from a strictly utilitarian point of  view, making the environment accessible will 
therefore increase the level of  happiness and comfort to 100% of  the population (not only the 
babies, but their parents and relatives and anyone who at the end of  the life, or sometime before 
that, will have to use wheelchairs during a certain period or permanently to move around). That is 
to say that, accepting that people who cannot walk are an equal part of  society and have the same 
dignity, and providing solutions to this reality, will increase the level of  happiness10, as it can create 
the most good for each person (see Roberts, 2002). 
This obvious approach has not been addressed before, because inequality has been established 
concerning functional diversity on the grounds of  “ability”, focusing on functional diverse people’s 
abilities or capabilities (see Toboso and Guzmán, 2009). This focus on ability has been the 
traditional moral approach to functional diversity, and always left out a group of  people “who we 
think have no abilities, or those whose abilities were never promoted” (Palacios and Romañach, 
2006, 97); and discriminating that group of  people made traditional models insufficient for a solid 
theoretical model that could be used in bioethical issues. This focus has supported different moral 
                                                
9 A 10% of  the population is discriminated on the grounds of  functional diversity. 
10 To read about a modern reflection about happiness see: Guibet Lafaye (2009a). 
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approaches like Nussbaum’s Capabilities approach (2006) or Peter Singer’s ethics (2002). 
The diversity approach rejects ability as a centerpiece for a philosophical approach to functional 
diversity. Dignity11 is the main founding of  the diversity model or approach, and dignity is divided 
into two branches or foundations: intrinsic dignity and extrinsic dignity. The first is related to the equal 
value of  every human life and the second is related to equal rights for everyone. Nowadays society 
provides neither the same intrinsic dignity nor the same extrinsic dignity to functionally diverse 
people. Therefore, it becomes necessary to develop new theoretical approaches that introduce in the 
bioethics debate a full support of  intrinsic dignity for people who are discriminated on the on the 
grounds of  their functional diversity.” (see Romañach et al. 2009). 
The diversity model demands a new bioethical approach that includes the voice of  functionally 
diverse people12 considering their own reality and experience of  life. The goal of  the model is to 
grant that the bioethical community will understand that functionally diverse people are not human 
beings that suffer for being different, but for being systematically discriminated or ignored due to 
their difference, and by the fact that their lives have been, and still are, systematically undervalued. 
The diversity model has been extended taking in consideration critic sociological proposals of  
discrimination mechanisms, through which discrimination takes effect in functionally diverse people 
daily life (mechanisms based on bio-political power techniques, on medical normalization of  the 
body13). It also considers the imposition on practices of  a habitus (Bourdieu, 1997), oriented by 
normalization.  
Consequently, and as needed for any social evolution, the task of  working deeper in that analysis 
becomes necessary in order to break domination logics (domination imposed through body, 
regulation, classification and submission) and to provide theoretical tools in an alternative liberating 
way (Romañach et al., 2009). 
From this point of  view, this paper is an extension of  the diversity model, in order to cover, and 
make it compatible with, or included in, other moral philosophy proposals. 
This humanist approach was constructed after performing an analysis of  human and social, legal 
and bioethical reality (Romañach et al., 2009) as lived and perceived by people who are 
discriminated on the grounds of  functional diversity. Some of  the diversity model key principles are 
not found in the complementary philosophical proposals that will be described later in this text, and 
will therefore provide new contributions to the diversity ethics proposal. The key principles 
established in the model are: 
- Functional diversity is part of  human diversity 
- Diversity is inherent in humanity and it enriches our society 
- Society should respect and provide full dignity for all human diversity  
To achieve full dignity for all human diversity society should: 
• Give the same value to the lives of  all human beings 
                                                
11 The pragmatic approach to the dignity concept in the diversity model was performed after analyzing several 
international documents related with bioethics and human rights and performing a semantic distillation of  what it 
meant in those documents. 
12 It should be noted that many approaches on the field (e.g. Nussbaum Capabilities model) have been proposed by 
people who do not live that reality daily.  
13 As pointed out by Foucault (1992, 1998). 
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• Respect the rights of  all persons 
The model relies on mutual recognition, as both the value of  life and rights are “given” by 
society, but it also relies on self-recognition; on self-diversity and self-recognition of  fragility for all 
human beings, and humanism. 
Together with the feminine approach to ethics, known as “care ethics” (Noddings, 1984), the 
diversity model also contributes to provide a new ethical approach to different human realities and 
challenges such as the “inDependency” or care situations. Care ethics diminishes the traditional 
asymmetry between the functional diverse people and the rest of  society, as it proposes a double way 
relation between subjects: “Clearly, the cared-for depends upon the one-caring. But the one-caring 
is also oddly dependent upon the cared for.” (Noddings, 1984, 48). In this way a new 
interdependency is proposed, that shortens distance between all humans, including in a way a less 
unequal status for functional diversity. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that care ethics never 
included functional diversity (Arnau Ripollés, 2009). Furthermore, this model has been used to 
question the sufficiency of  contemporary theoretical models14 such as Rawls’ Theory of  Justice15 and 
Nussbaum’s Capabilities approach (Nussbaum, 2006). 
4. Facing the challenge of extending the diversity theoretical 
framework 
All different theoretical approaches to diversity reach a point in which other diversities must be 
considered, as a complex human reality within each one of  them.  
“Contemporary challenges for modern moral reasoning from a number of  perspectives 
have lead to a recognition that moral claims are made within the social world moral 
multiplicity. This world is marked by diversity and complexity-diversity created by 
differences within and among persons and a correlative complexity created by multiple criss-
crossing our relations and resulting contradictions. Challenges to moral reasoning have also 
initiated a passionate debate as to whether morality can be sustained at all in the face of 
moral diversity.” (Jakobsen, 1998, 4). 
Thus different diversities from within feminists have raised different moral approaches: 
 “These challenges come from our ideals movements which have articulated "different" 
moral voices-feminist, womanist, mujérista, and lesbian to name a few (Gilligan 1982, Cannon 
1988, Isasi-Díaz 1993, Hoaglnd 1988) - as well as from post-modern critiques of  modern 
conceptions of  subjectivity and agency (Benhabib et al. 1995). The relationships among and 
between these various perspectives on their critiques are hotly debated. For example, 
Mohanty (1994, 163, fn 4) reads the two sides is producing different types of  analysis. 
Lugones argues that “post-modern literature… goes against a politics of  identity and toward 
minimizing the political significance of  groups”; while her position, one of  which can also be 
seen in “the literature on mestizaje, affirms a complex version of  identity politics and a 
complex conception of  groups” (475).” (Jakobsen, 1998, 4, footnote 7). 
These different voices have mainly raised within a certain oppressed or conflict group, 
maintaining moral issues around the singularity of  the group, defined by a pre-established 
borderline with the rest of  society. 
                                                
14 See Romañach (2009, 23-28) and Guzmán, Romañach and Toboso (2009). 
15 Rawls, 1971, tr. sp., 51. 
 9 
To overcome that limitation, moral philosophers like Axel Honneth and Nancy Fraser have 
developed new broader moral approaches that intend to establish common grounds and proposals 
in mutual recognition and redistribution theory, incorporating all diversities. Unfortunately, 
nowadays this approach does not include functional diversity. 
4.1 Mutual recognition and redistribution 
The insufficiency of  a single approach to face moral challenges for society, demands a more 
complex method. As described Honneth and Fraser social movements are nowadays facing the 
challenge of  integrating redistribution and recognition: 
“Within social movements such as feminism, for example, activist tendencies that look to 
redistribution as the remedy for male domination are increasingly dissociated from tendencies 
that look instead to recognition of  gender difference.” (Fraser and Honneth, 2003, 8). 
Both authors consider redistribution and recognition as key issues in future diversity ethics. 
Redistribution’s origins can be found in the liberal tradition, especially its late XXth century. In the 
latter part of  the century, when it was richly expanded by philosophers such as John Rawls and 
Ronald Dworkin, in their theories of  distributive justice. They tried to synthesize the traditional 
liberal emphasis on individual liberty with the egalitarianism of  social democracy, proposing new 
conceptions of  justice that could justify socio-economic redistribution.  
Insufficiency of  Rawls’ “Theory of  justice” to address functional diversity has already been 
pointed out by Martha Nussbaum. Starting from Scanlon’s proposals Nussbaum states that: “Either 
we persist in our pursuit of  the contract doctrine, and say that the contracting parties are also 
trustees for those who are incapable of  participating; or we may say that the contract doctrine offers 
an account of  only one type of  morality: we need a different account to cope with the facts of  
extreme dependency.” (Nussbaum, 2006, 136). 
In order to solve that issue, Martha Nussbaum, following Eva Kittay and Amartya Sen tried to 
include functional diversity in these contractualist theories, and proposed the capabilities approach, 
closely linked to human rights (Nussbaum, 2006, 150). Nussbaum proposal goes beyond Rawls 
theory of  justice, and proposes some reformulations, based on Kittay’s and Sen’s ideas, and a list of  
ten items that would guarantee functional diverse people dignity, and define a basic social justice 
(Nussbaum, 2006, 76). 
Nussbaum’s Capabilities approach is a solid step to include functional diversity in moral 
philosophy, nevertheless, the analysis performed from the diversity approach has already stated the 
insufficiency of  her approach in this respect, as “…her approach to support intrinsic or moral 
dignity is not solid or consistent, as she mixes medical model’s thesis, and considers the cure of 
functional diversity as a moral obligation of  a just society, emphasizing the medical aspects of  the 
person must be repaired so that you can access the list of  "capabilities"” (Romañach, 2009, 36). This 
approach would then exclude some human beings that would have to be “repaired” to have access 
to the capabilities list, giving less value to those person’s lives. 
Furthermore, even if  conflicts over interests were justly adjudicated, society would remain 
normatively deficient while its members are systematically denied the recognition they deserve. And 
this recognition is not just an unmet courtesy that people need. 
Recognition designates a relation that structures and constitutes self-identity as auto-
consciousness, and reciprocal relation between subjects in which each sees the other as its equal but 
as separate. One becomes an individual subject only in virtue of  recognizing and being recognized 
by another subject. Therefore, recognition implies the Hegelian thesis that social relations are prior 
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to individuals, and that intersubjectivity is prior to subjectivity. Recognition theory is currently 
undergoing a renaissance, as neo-Hegelian philosophers such as Charles Taylor and Axel Honneth 
are making it a central issue in their politics of  difference. In fact, recognition “is proving central to 
efforts to conceptualize today’s tools for over identity and difference. Whether the issue is an 
indigenous land claims or women’s keyword, homosexual marriage or Muslim headscarves, moral 
philosophers increasingly use the term "recognition" to unpack the moment if  basis of  political 
claims. They find that a category that conditions subjects’ autonomy on intersubjective regard well 
captures the moral stakes of  many contemporary conflicts.” (Fraser and Honneth, 2003, 1). 
Gender, religion, culture, race and sexual orientation are taken in account by recognition 
philosophers but, functional diversity is consistently omitted as part of  diversity, or as a part of  the 
conflict between human identity and human difference. 
Despite this omission, recognition can be thought as a fundamental part of  future diversity ethic 
theories, as it has no specific mention to functional diversity exclusion. Some concepts like dignity, 
which is a centerpiece in the diversity approach, and many other aspects of  functional diversity 
struggle, like emancipation and inviolability of  physical integrity, can also be found in recognition 
theories. 
However, it is the combination of  both recognition and redistribution that is now understood as 
the path to follow to achieve justice, as it has been pointed out by modern authors working on 
recognition:  
“As social struggles of  the last few decades have made clear, justice demands more than fair 
distribution of  material goods.”… “Regularly, members of  marginalized and subaltern groups 
have been systematically denied recognition for the worth of  their culture and way of  life, the 
dignity of  their status as persons, and the inviolability of  their physical integrity. Most strikingly 
in the politics of  identity, their struggles for recognition have come to dominate the political 
landscape. Consequently, if  social theory is to provide an adequate account of  actual fields of  
social conflict, it to us for both to situate the motivation for these emancipatory struggles within 
the social world and provide an account of  what justifies them.” (Honneth, 1996, x). 
As for today, the relation between recognition and redistribution theories and functional diversity 
can be resumed in the following terms: recognition does not explicitly exclude functional diversity, 
but it does not include functional diversity as any other diversity yet; and redistribution has proven 
to be insufficient to provide sound moral founding for this group of  people.16 
Thus, we will propose an extension of  this recognition and redistribution theories that would 
include the diversity approach, contributing to the construction of  a wider and more solid model. It 
would include functional diversity’s issues – that affect about a 10% of  the population. It would 
provide more equality and diminish discrimination, even perhaps erase it. This model would also 
provide theoretical grounds to deal with bioethical issues. We propose to name this new approach as 
“Ethics of  diversity”. 
                                                
16 Furthermore, moral philosophy does not often deal with bioethics challenges such as genetic selection, abortion, 
medical research, embryo moral status, etc. These are crucial issues for functional diversity, as functionally diverse 
people feel threatened by some experts’ positions and practices in those fields, that include Peter Singer: “We are 
threatened when Peter Singer, a professor of  bioethics, writes: "It does not seem quite wise to increase any further 
draining of  limited resources by increasing the number of  children with impairments."” (DISABLED PEOPLE 
INTERNATIONAL EUROPE (DPI), 2000). 
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4.2 Self-respect. Fundamental social achievements approach. 
On the process of  extending the theoretical framework, it is important to include a concept and 
demand from the functional diversity social movements, that has not been considered before: self-
respect.17 This concept is considered essential not only for functional diverse people, as the need for 
self-respect and self-esteem in diversity: 
“…Painful feelings and unhappiness resulting from a lack of  self-esteem, can therefore be a 
legitimate focus of  social attention. In some cases, it is clear that the fact of  being unhappy is a 
legitimate cause of  social concern, regardless of  how it occurred (which explains the existence, 
in France, for example, of  Centers of  Clinical psychotherapy). At the very least, it seems 
crucial to identify appropriate social measures that will contribute by redistributive channels, 
to guarantee a minimum of  individual and social achievements that would feed, positively, 
everyone’s self-respect. The fundamental concern of  social achievements, discussed here in a 
broad outline, demands that institutions and social policies take in account agents’ and, 
indirectly, their achievements in private spheres. These compensation measures will focus on 
individual achievements or results in their social dimension, assuming that individuals take 
responsibility for their private accomplishments. Unlike attention exclusively focused on 
opportunities or capabilities, the approach based on fundamental social achievements is 
concerned with distribution lots, once individual achievements have been completed, that is to 
say at the end of  redistribution. In that way, it rejects the notion of  responsibility provides 
sufficient justification for existing social inequalities or the situation of  poor people considered 
"undeserving" and most disadvantaged. It finally offers a way to reconcile the desire for 
redistribution and recognition.” (Guibet Lafaye, 2007). 
For the approach based on fundamental social achievements, equality for the poor should be 
measured at the end of  the redistribution process, including social self-respect. But recognition 
would not suffice to grant this issue. This same approach can be extended to any diversity that 
requires both recognition and redistribution, as indigenous, functionally diverse people, migrants, 
etc. 
5. Towards a new diversity ethics approach 
Constructing ethics of  diversity should be done in an open collaborative way, with a constant 
effort to include new foundations and ideas that would lead to the same goal: a future society in 
which all human diversity is welcome and equality granted for all. 
Some authors like Honneth and Fraser have started working under those premises, developing a 
common framework that will assess diverging answers (Fraser and Honneth, 2003, 5), providing an 
starting point that will incorporate fundamental pieces for diversity ethics. Nevertheless, the door 
will remain open for other ethical developments diversity ethics may include in its future evolutions. 
5.1 Contributions of the diversity approach 
As it has been explained, redistribution theories explicitly excluded functional diversity from 
start, and there have been attempts to make it fit within that framework, but those attempts have 
been analyzed and considered insufficient by the diversity approach. Although recognition theories 
do not explicitly exclude functional diversity, they do not include functional diversity as any other 
diversity yet. Therefore, including functional diversity in these theories will add some pieces to the 
                                                
17 As stated in the Independent Living philosophy: “Independent Living is a philosophy and a movement of  people with 
disabilities who work for self-determination, equal opportunities and self-respect”. 
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puzzle contributing to build a stronger approach. 
In first place, diversity approach can easily be extended to any human diversity: gender, sexual 
orientation, religion, race, age, etc. by just taking away the word “functional” from the first 
statement of  its premises (see section 3.1). The result would then be:  
- Diversity is part of  human diversity 
- Diversity is inherent in humanity and it enriches our society 
- Society should respect and provide full dignity for all human diversity  
To achieve full dignity for all human diversity society should: 
• Give the same value to the lives of  all human beings 
• Respect the rights of  all persons 
Dignity, understood as giving the same value to all human beings, and same rights to all persons, 
would become a center piece of  recognition and distribution, and would explicitly mean same value 
for human lives and same rights for all persons. 
In the other hand, the diversity approach is built from the most fragile situation of  any human 
being, making human fragility another fundamental founding of  this new ethic approach. Any 
human being is bound to contingency, and is consequently a potential candidate for this type of 
diversity, as accidents happen through life than can put any one in that situation. Furthermore, 
functional diversity is unconsciously desired by all who want to live a long life, as statistics show that 
it is inherent to the process of  ageing. 
This makes functional diversity not only a recognition issue, but also a self-recognition issue. It 
may be not that frequent for humans to, voluntarily or involuntarily, change race, gender, culture, 
sexual orientation or religion, but no one can be sure today of  what will happen to him or herself  
tomorrow, thus all humans are potential candidates for functional diversity. What is missing is just 
awareness of  this fragility. In fact, awareness of  the functional diversity we all had when we were 
babies.  
This lack of  awareness is not casual but it is a consequence of  domination logics: “functionally 
diverse people embody domination logics through an specific habitus (Bourdieu, 1991) in which 
good, beautiful and healthy normative is registered; on the other hand, the body is central to 
regulatory and political control issues that come from Bio-politics and Normalization Technologies 
(Foucault, 1992; 1998).” (Romañach et al., 2009). 
The diversity model states that nowadays society provides no equality in functional diversity 
(Palacios and Romañach, 2006, 65-98), that moral issues have consequences in the future society, 
and that a choice must be done today on two types of  future social construction: a non-
discriminatory society built to include the fragility derived from functional diversity, or a 
discriminatory society constructed only for useful “normal” persons, in which fragility would be 
considered a human flaw. The diversity model also warns that “normality” is a social construction 
and domination logics consequence, not a biological question. 
The diversity approach naturally fits under Hegelian human recognition, that we can find in 
Honneth’s thesis, where recognition is prior to redistribution, as human beings should first recognize 
their own fragility and diversity and then select redistribution as an essential tool to grant justice and 
rights. And with those rights and adequate resources, an easy path to enjoy self-respect would be 
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established. 
In the same way society accepts newborn’s fragility and provides redistribution to bear a child 
while his or her fragility is assumed, this concept should naturally expand to all society, all ages and 
all fragility derived from human diversity. And, as indicated before, this redistribution should be 
measured at the end of  the process, evaluating individually achieved social self-respect and self-
esteem. 
5.2 Fitting all pieces 
The new ethics of  diversity recognition would rely then on breaking domination logics to obtain 
a basic human recognition of  self  reality and humanity. That humanity would inherently include self  
diversity, which would incorporate human fragility as a starting point of  social progress. As a 
consequence, redistribution theories, following the social achievements approach and policies, 
should be developed to guarantee justice and diversity social support, because diversity and fragility 
of  other human beings would become recognized in ourselves. 
In order to be coherent with that diversity recognition, society should give all human lives the 
same values and provide all persons with the same rights in a struggle for a future society in which 
all diversities would be celebrated and supported18. 
With this new ethics of  diversity, foundations for bioethical issues, specially those related with 
functional diversity, would be part of  a new extension of  recognition and redistribution theories. 
6. Confronting diversity ethics with Peter Singers ethics 
Once the main structure of  the diversity model has been established, we are ready to confront it 
with Singer’s ethical arguments to prove its strength. We will do this in two steps. First we will point 
out incoherencies, contradictions and wrong assumptions in his ethics. Then we will compare 
diversity ethics bioethical positions with Singers’ opinions, and point out the different future societies 
both positions may lead to. 
6.1 Peter Singer and the moral status of nonhuman beings 
6.1.1  The moral community: from description to evaluation 
The thesis defended by Peter Singer is quite original in moral philosophy as it suggests extending 
the limits of  the moral community to ontic entities – which, until now, have been excluded – and to 
exclude others which were undoubtedly considered part of  it. For Singer, it is about adopting a 
perspective that definitively breaks with the classical humanism, on behalf  of  animal respect:  
“Many authors challenged humanism, that is, the doctrine that all and only human lives 
have an equal, absolute value (Glover 1977; Tooley 1983; Rachels 1986; Kuhse 1997). The 
humanistic view has two sides: an inclusive one which grants privileged moral status to all 
humans, and an exclusive one which grants that status only to humans. By emphasizing the 
moral irrelevance of  the species membership, and by arguing that, for example, the embryo, 
the fetus, of  the comatose are not humans in the evaluative sense, those authors undermine 
the inclusive side of  humanism and, accordingly, the traditional notion of  moral community. 
This naturally furthered the revision of  the moral status of  nonhumans which, through its 
                                                
18 In the way outlined by Galston (1995).  
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criticism of  the exclusive side of  humanism, the ethics of  animal liberation was pursuing.” 
(Singer, 2002, 131)19. 
The evaluative perspective - rather than descriptive - that P. Singer proposes over the moral 
community places its core in the criteria of  rationality, autonomy and self-consciousness (Singer, 
1993, p. 188). These criteria for assessing humanity should replace the simple reference to the 
biological species. The membership of  the moral community would no longer have ontic basis (i.e. 
linked to the specie) but would be based on “ability”. According to Singer, what is important is not 
whether a life is human or nonhuman; rather, what is of  central importance from an ethical 
perspective what interests and capacities this being has. Based on the principle of  the equal 
consideration of  interests, Singer argues against the privileged status of  humans and the 
conventional assumption that we are, simply because we are human.  
The consequence of  P. Singer’s dual perspective - descriptive and evaluative - taken on human 
entities consists in the exclusion of  some of  them, especially “embryos, fetus or comatose individual 
[which] are not human in the evaluative sense” (Singer, 2002, 131), and newborns with “incurable 
medical condition” (Singer, 2002, 284). This redefinition of  the limits of  the moral community is 
inseparable from a reinterpretation of  the frontiers of  humanity and of  what is worthy or not to be 
recognized as human. The question then is: 
“Political philosophy seems to see the concept of person unproblematic. This is not so in 
bioethics. Though the word "person" is, in current use, often used as if  it meant the same as 
"human being," the terms are generally not seen as equivalent in bioethical discussions. Most 
authors in fact use "person" to refer in an unambiguous way to the second of  the already 
mentioned senses of  the word "human," that is, the philosophical sense of  possessing certain 
characteristics like self-awareness and rationality; this is distinct from the biological sense of 
"human," meaning belonging to the species Homo sapiens.” (Singer, 2002, 133). 
In fact, “a distinction is often made between two uses of  "person," the descriptive (also 
sometimes labeled as metaphysical) and the normative (or moral). On this view, to say of  some 
being that she is a person in the descriptive sense is to cover some information about what the 
being is like, and this can amount to saying that she has characteristics a, b, c; on the other hand 
to use the term "person" in a normative way is to use it simply to ascribe moral properties - 
usually some rights or duties, and frequently the right to life - for being so denominated 
(Feinberg 1980).” (Singer, 2002, 133). 
Nevertheless, this position is far from unanimity. Concerning the embryo status, the failure to 
reach agreement on this debate has been raised by Habermas: 
“Despite these differences, there is something we can learn from the abortion debate, a 
debate that has seriously been sustained for decades; the failure of  all attempts to arrive at a 
neutral cosmovisional description (i.e. not prejudiced) moral status of  nascent human life, a 
description that is acceptable to all citizens of  a secular society. One part describes the 
embryo in early development stage as a "bunch of cells," in contraposition to the person of 
the newborn, to whom human dignity corresponds in a strict moral sense. The other part 
considers the fertilization of  human egg relevant as the beginning of  a process of  
development as an individual governed by itself. Seeing things in this way, all biologically 
determinable specimen as belonging to the species must be considered as a potential person 
                                                
19 This ambition of  animal condition liberation had already been adopted in the past: “But is there any reason why we 
should be suffered to torment them?. Not that I can see.” ….“The day may come when the rest of  the animal creation 
may acquire those right which never could have been witholden from them but by the hand of  tyranny.” (Bentham, 
1780, 235). 
 15 
and bearer of  fundamental rights.” (Habermas, 2002, 48). 
This raises two irreconcilable visions of  a “person” whose use as the foundation of  dignity. 
Actually, 
“found[ing] the dignity of  man on the notion of  person is doubly problematic. First, the 
concept of  "person" states a dignity that is not characteristic of  men. This concept also 
applies to God and the angels (if  any), other non-human rational beings and even animals 
possess self-awareness. Secondly, this dignity does not extend to all men: the embryos, 
newborns, the comatose human beings, certain types of  functional diversity (handicap) 
mental, etc. are excluded because they do not exhibit the characteristics of  the "person".” 
(Bouriau, 2007, 11-12). 
Peter Singer proposes a reformulation of  this issue from a different moral perspective, that is not 
in ontic or species terms, (i.e. referin to the specie) but in ethical terms:  
“…a question about which only a few philosophers have appreciated that the crucial issue is 
not as many people assume, "When does the fetus become a human being?", but rather "What 
are the characteristics of  a being that make it wrong to kill that being?”. It is by no means obvious that 
being a member of  the sapiens Homo Species is what counts on the second question. Sentience or 
even a certain measure of  self-awareness might be more appropriate characteristics to choose.” 
(Singer, 2002, 61). 
This new determination of  the moral community borders, and of  whom might deserve respect – 
i.e. not being annihilated– means that killing someone with “sensibility or even a certain dose of 
auto-consciousness” would be a crime. That includes some animals and, from this point of  view, it 
would not include certain Homo Sapiens beings. This is a central point on his thesis to support the 
idea that some animals should not be killed, while some traditionally considered humans can. 
6.1.2  Aporia and counterfactuality of a position called pragmatic 
Thus, this redefinition of  the contours of  the moral community - that imposes moral obligations 
regarding those who are included - is supposed to provide answers to delicate situations that are 
frequently considered to be associated with forms of  life that deviate from what is recognized as the 
standard. Therefore: 
“In the case of  defective infants, however, replacement could be a desirable option. 
Suppose that a couple plans to have two children. The first child is normal but the second is 
diagnosed immediately after birth as a sever case of spina bifida. If  it lives, the child will grow 
up paralyzed from the waist down, incontinent and mentally retarded – though he might, for 
all that, have a tolerable pleasant existance, if  it is intensively cared for. Suppose the couple 
do not wish to give the child up to an institution, fearing that it might not receive the best 
care there. Yet they are equally unhappy at the prospect of  trying to bring up such a child. 
They still want two normal children. They feel that with the burden of  a handicapped as 
well as a normal child to bring up, however, they cannot have another child. The 
replaceability principle would allow them to kill the defective infant and then go ahead with 
another pregnancy.” (Singer, 2002, 120)20. 
As stated, he considers that certain humans could easily be replaced, because in that way we 
                                                
20 Before starting the analysis, it should be noted that P. Singer commits a fallacy, since he draws a conclusion not 
related to the initial premise of  his reasoning, but a term he introduced after the exposure of  the situation initially 
described. 
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would spare them and their relatives a miserable live, reviewing the idea of  equality. That allows 
him to suggest: 
“I wanted to point out that the only logical alternative – to do anything possible to 
preserve life at any cost – was extremely cruel in those cases where the only prospect was 
months of  suffering before a premature death. A decision not to do everything possible to 
preserve life, on the other hand, already involves an implicit judgment that the quality of  that 
life is so poor that it is not worth prolonging it - in other words, a judgment that some lives 
are not worth living. Once such decision had been taken, it might be kinder to take active 
steps to end that life quickly, rather than to allow an infant to die from dehydration, or from 
an infection” (Singer, 2002, 69). 
P. Singer’s ontological proposition has therefore consequences and a moral impact, as he judges 
irresponsible to contribute to preseveration of  a being in this type of  existence (“It does not seem 
quite wise to increase any further draining of  limited resources by increasing the number of  children 
with impairments.”21), particularly on the basis of  a reference to the quality of  life – a concept hard 
to evaluate as it might be subjective and controversial (Fagot-Largeault 1991; Guibet Lafaye 2009b). 
In short, there would be a moral duty to end, or to prevent the survival of  a human being “paralyzed 
from chest down” and “incontinent”, even when that human can live perfectly well in nowadays 
society. Actually, that is the case of  one of  the authors of  this text. This position should therefore 
face many objections. 
In first place, this moral duty is introduced by a logical error included in the reasoning proposed 
by Singer. Indeed if  you replace a human being with another to be born, that will not be the same 
human being, but a different one (see Guibet Lafaye, 2009c). The logical error sometimes comes in 
the form of  medical inaccuracy, because the proposed description of  a condition such as spina bifida 
refers to its most advanced form, is not correct all cases. This is particularly true when Singer 
discusses the tendency of  being mentally retarded. On the issue of  being “mentally retarded”, Peter 
Singer makes another mistake, as spina bifida does not necessarily lead to that “retardation”.22 
In second place, Peter Singer tends to assume what it is called the medical model of  functional 
diversity, that is, to consider a human being just by its biological or medical description. As a 
consequence he questions: 
“But how do we square this view with our intuitions about the reverse case, when a 
couple are considering having a child who, perhaps because it will inherit a genetic defect, 
would lead a throughly miserable life and die before its second birthday?” (Singer, 2002, 
115). 
In fact the same individual can be defined in different ways. If  we use a medical model definition 
one would be a “spine core injured person, incontinent, spastic, paralyzed from chest down, with 
dexterity problems in upper limbs, etc.” But the same individual can also be described as a 
“computer scientist, social activist and writer, bioethics expert, friend of  his friends, lover of  his 
family, etc.”. These are not divergent descriptions of  an individual reality which is nothing to say 
that one is more real or relevant than the other. These two descriptions are equally true. Stressing 
the first one is, in fact, motivated by the projection on ignored situations - because they are not lived 
in first person – of  presumed sufferance.23 The prevalence of  the first description is motivated by an 
                                                
21 DISABLED PEOPLE INTERNATIONAL EUROPE (2000).  
22 Moreover “retarded” constitutes a normative description that corresponds to a value given to a certain mind in a 
given time, comparing it to other minds. But anyone’s mind is different from the others, and drawing the line between 
what is retarded, and what is not, is a social issue, not a biological issue. 
23 Concerning the issues on sufferance and lifes not worth to be lived see: Romañach, 2009, 65-81. 
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aversion to sufferance that is widely shared by common sense.  
Finally the theoretical position defended by P. Singer will highlight a specific feature in bioethics 
and medical ethics discourse and reflection, that gives a central role to the experience in first person 
- in this case an argument of  last resort - that is not recognizez in other forms of  normative 
elaboration or analysis principles in the philosophical discourse. Even if  such an argument does have 
an impact on the evolution of  normative debate in the public sphere, it cannot become a central 
moral argument, insofar as personal experience can influence the reflection both in one direction 
and in the opposite (see the sharing of  individual experiences in the bioethics États Généraux in 
France, 2009). At a first level of  analysis this can be observed in the contrast between the P. Singer’s 
experience, and the experience of  one of  the authors of  this text, who was R&D computer science 
researcher and a “first-class” citizen when at the age of  28 he had a motorcycle accident, and now 
lives with a quadriplegia that was the outcome of  the accident. 
Had this author read Peter Singer’s thesis before the accident, he would have probably agreed 
with them. Furthermore he has publicly stated that before the accident “he would have preferred to 
be dead rather than live in a wheelchair”.24 A similar change of  position was assumed by P. Singer. 
In fact, this is a similar but more extended experience as the one Peter Singer lived “when (instead 
of  doing what his critics said his philosophy would demand), he did not kill his mother, who had 
advanced Alzheimer’s disease and whose care was consuming money that could, those critics said, 
more profitable be spent elsewhere.” (Singer, 2002, 11). No matter how coherent P. Singer’s 
position from a principles analysis is, its limits must be admitted, as his ethics should become a 
model for action. 
Furthermore the consequence of  accepting that “ability” as the relevant issue to consider a being 
as part of  the moral community is that:  
“If  we were to encounter alien beings from another planet, something that looks like 
green slime but engages in complex behaviours, we would not be justified in failing to extend 
respectful treatment to the aliens merely on the ground that they belong to another species. 
If  they proved to be like humans in morally relevant respects, then they should be treated the 
same as humans. Very roughly speaking, if  the aliens showed a capacity for rational, 
autonomous agency, we would be required to include them within the scope of  our moral 
principles.” (Arneson, 1998). 
If  we accept Singer’s ethics “the problem is to specify moral principles that yield intuitively 
satisfactory implications for the treatment of  human individuals and other individual animals given 
that cognitive capacities differ across species and individuals.” (Arneson, 1998). That is to say, it 
would be very hard to obtain moral grounds for equality, non discrimination and justice. 
Singer is also incoherent when he confronts presupposed sufferance of  animals and functionally 
diverse humans, as he concedes the benefit of  doubt to animals: “On the other hand, it is difficult to 
establish that an animal has not will to live, and even in the case of  the hen there might be enough 
reasons to think if  it would not be best to concede the benefit of  doubt”.  
But when it comes to what he considers not to be humans, or what he considers to be replaceable 
humans, prudence and benefit of  doubt disappear (Singer, 2002, 95): “I wanted to make clear that 
the only logical alternative - insisting in preserving that live at all cost-was extremely cruel for the 
kid in those cases in which these only perspective was of  months of  sufferance before a premature 
                                                
24 Romañach, 2009, 58, footnote 70. The role of  experience in first person as an argument of  last resort, is confirmed by 
the normative changes induced to end-of-life requests of  Vincent Humbert in France, or Ramon Sampedro in Spain. 
For a reverse view on Sampedro’s case see Romañach, 2005.  
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death.” And his incoherent attitude to concede benefit of  doubt is not based in scientific evidence, 
but on his own subjective perspective. 
6.2 Bioethical responses to Peter Singer’s thesis 
Once diversity ethics is constructed including all pieces as previously described, some bioethical 
positions have already been developed from one of  its parts, the diversity approach. The ethics of  
diversity legitimates a future society in which recognition of  all human diversity and fragility would 
be granted. In order to sustain that guarantee all human lives would be valued as equal. 
Human lives equal value would then give support to consistent and coherent bioethics positions 
such as the following. Concerning research on humans, “it should not be allowed to investigate in 
humans who do not give their consent” (Romañach, 2009, 204-205), always, because consent, i.e. 
individual personal consent is the only guarantee we have for equality, and consent provided by 
others (e.g. by tutors), has historically proved not to be always in the best interest of  the individual 
whose consent has been overtaken. Furthermore, experience shows that overriding consent in 
history has lead to unequal societies. Following that argument, sterilization of  functionally diverse 
people should be banned for the future. 
Concerning new genetics, although they can be used in a positive way, the way we’re facing and 
using them today means “undermining the normative autocomprehension of  people that guide their 
own lives and show respect for each other” (Habermas, 2002, 45), a threat to diversity, specially 
functional diversity25 and a new subtle form of  eugenics (Romañach, 2009, 159).  
Eugenics that can also be detected in modern abortion laws26, embryo selection, sterilization and 
infanticide. Diversity ethics clearly states that “selecting an embryo means a genetic selection under 
major cultural patterns, and is therefore eugenics, in the same it is considered to be eugenics 
infanticide on the grounds of  functional diversity, and that eugenics means giving a different value 
to the lives of  functionally diverse and therefore a decrease of  their full dignity” (Romañach, 2009, 
204-205); and that “today eugenic practices occur through abortion, genetic selection and 
sterilization, that the door to a death in dignity should be opened when conditions exist to ensure 
full dignity in functional diversity”.  
Furthermore past eugenics practices and experiences prove that accepting eugenics in a society 
has lead to unequal societies, and they should be not be allowed any further (Evans, 2004). 
Therefore, ethics on diversity would frontally confront all Singer’s thesis in ethical and bioethical 
issues related to functional diversity, on the grounds of  a solid and coherent ethical approach, and a 
moral community definition that should be considered if  a future society in which all humans would 
be accepted in equal terms and social justice is desired. 
7. Conclusions 
Our aim in this article is to propose a solid powerful extension of  recognition and redistribution 
ethics: diversity ethics. These ethics reinforce prior approaches due to the inclusion of  functional 
diversity as part of  human diversity to be accounted for in moral philosophy, the need to break 
social domination logics, and to analyze redistribution at the end of  the process, to ensure it will 
account for self-respect and self-esteem, another forgotten issue in diversity. 
                                                
25 DISABLED PEOPLE INTERNATIONAL EUROPE (2000).  
26 Spain approved in 2010 a new abortion law that maintains the eugenic abortion. 
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The inclusion of  functional diversity in recognition and redistribution ethics proposes the idea of 
auto-recognition of  fragility and diversity in all humans, as we’re all functionally diverse and risk 
personal discrimination on those grounds. Furthermore, a pragmatic approach of  dignity, based on 
giving the same value for all human lives, is included in diversity ethics, providing tools to face 
bioethical challenges. 
Diversity ethics is proposed as a choice for the future society, as we are to choose now whether in 
the future we will live in a non-discriminatory society in which all human diversity is welcome and 
every individual regardless of  her or his differences, abilities and productivity has a chance to live 
and enjoy life at any age; or we will live in a society in which not all diversity is accepted, a 
discriminatory society in which only people who are useful, capable, smart, skilled, with good sight 
and hearing, etc. will be welcome and allowed to live and enjoy what society provides. 
Making a clear choice of  the first option, diversity ethics has been confronted with P. Singer’s 
ethics, that have chosen the second option, showing their weakness and incoherencies. Alternative 
bioethical positions have also been exposed, that are coherent with the choice of  a future society in 
which all humans will have the right to justice and equality, as we need a society different from the 
one we have today, a society in which inequalities are reproduced through generations.  
8. Bibliography 
ARNAU RIPOLLÉS, S. (2009) “El «cuidado» y sus perversiones: la cultura de la violencia”. Revista 
Intersticios. Vol. 3. nº 2.  
ARNESON, R.J. (1998) “What, if  anything, renders all humans morally equal?”, in Dale Jamieson (ed.), 
Peter Singer and His Critics, Oxford, Blackwell, 1999. 
BARNES, C., MERCER, G, SHAKESPEARE, T. (1999) Exploring disability: a sociological 
introduction. Polity Press and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Cambridge. UK.  
BENHABIB, S. (2002) “The claims of  culture: equality and diversity in the global era”. Princeton. 
Princeton University Press. Web available:  
http://books.google.es/books?hl=es&lr=&id=pRXN_VS9ShUC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=nancy+fraser+diversity&
ots=5ey5yVPBQK&sig=4pi8LRFpzSWdyHs7vciz02K_ATI#v=onepage&q=nancy%20fraser%20diversity
&f=false 
BENTHAM, J. (1780) An introduction to the principles of  morals and legislation, vol. 2. Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1907. Web available:  http://books.google.es/books?id=F53AxEX-
jEUC&printsec=frontcover&dq=jeremy+bentham+principles+of+morals&as_brr=1&cd=4#v=onepage&q
=&f=false 
BOURDIEU, P. (1997) Capital cultural, escuela y espacio social, s. XXI, Madrid. 
BOURIAU, C. (2007) Qu’est-ce que l’humanisme?. Vrin. Coll. Chemins philosophiques. Paris. 
DISABLED PEOPLE INTERNATIONAL EUROPE (DPI) (2000). “Disabled People Speak on the New 
Genetics. DPI Europe Position Statement on Bioethics and Human Rights”. Web available: 
http://www.mindfully.org/GE/Disabled-People-Speak.htm#position 
DRAKE, S., COLEMAN, D. (1999) Independent Living Insitute. “Fact Sheet on Peter Singer” 
http://www.independentliving.org/docs5/singer.html  
EVANS S. E. (2004) Forgotten crimes. The holocaust and people with disabilities. Disability Rights. Ivan 
 20 
R. Dee. (ed.). Chicago. 
FAGOT-LARGEAULT A. (1991) “Réflexions sur la notion de qualité de vie”, Archives de philosophie du 
droit, vol. 36, Sirey, pp. 135-153.  
FOUCAULT, M. (1992) Genealogía del racismo, La Piqueta, Madrid.  
-- (1998) Vigilar y castigar: nacimiento de la prisión, Siglo XXI, Madrid. 
FRASER, N., HONNETH, A. (2003) Redistribution or recognition? A political-philosophical exchange. 
Verso. Londres, New York. Web available:  
http://books.google.es/books?id=IJxT6pxjO7YC&lpg=PP1&dq=Redistribution%20or%20Recognition%3
F%20A%20Political-Philosophical%20Exchange&pg=PA1#v=onepage&q=&f=false 
FRASER, N. (2005) Reframing justice. Koninklijke Van Gorcum (ed.). Web available:  
http://books.google.es/books?hl=es&lr=&id=zZ_4ZvjY1XsC&oi=fnd&pg=PA9&dq=nancy+fraser+refrA
MING&ots=proidOYsP-&sig=yCPHqwJqzBSHIJkee0NDyfTukTs#v=onepage&q=&f=false 
GALSTON, W.A. (1995) “Two Concepts of  Liberalism”. Ethics. vol. 105, n° 3. (Apr., 1995), pp. 516-534. 
University of  Chicago Press.  
GLOBAL ETHIC FOUNDATION (1993) “Declaration Toward a Global Ethic”. Parliament of  the 
World’s Religions 4 September 1993 Chicago, U.S.A. Web available: http://www.weltethos.org/dat-
english/03-declaration.htm 
GUIBET LAFAYE C. (2007) “Reconnaissance vs. Redistribution: le cas du respect de soi” (Recognition 
versus Redistribution: the case of  self-respect). Filosofia Unisinos. Universidade do Vale do Rio Dos 
Sinos, São Leopoldo (Brésil). vol. 8, n°3. 2007, pp. 227-246. 
GUIBET LAFAYE, C. (2009a). Penser le bonheur aujourd’hui. UCL Presses Universitaires de Louvain. 
GUIBET LAFAYE Caroline (2009b). “Du pratique au normatif: le cas de la réanimation néonatale”, 
Revista Portuguesa Filosofia, n° 27, Braga (Portugal). 
GUIBET LAFAYE C. (2009c) “Why accept the refusal of  termination of  pregnancy in the case of  a very 
bad prognosis regarding neonatal viability?”, Ethical Perspectives, vol. 16, n°4, Leuwen, Peeters 
Publishers, pp. 485-508.  
GUZMÁN, F., ROMAÑACH CABRERO J., TOBOSO, M. (2009) “Fundamentos éticos para la 
promoción de la autonomía y la interdependencia: La erradicación de la dependencia”. Ponencia 
presentada en I Congreso anual REPS (Red Española de Políticas Sociales). Universidad de 
Oviedo: Treinta años de Estado de Bienestar en España. Logros y retos para el futuro. Web 
available: http://www.espanet-spain.net/congreso2009/archivos/ponencias/TP11P04.pdf  
HABERMAS, J. (2002) El futuro sobre la naturaleza humana. ¿Hacia una eugenesia liberal?. Ediciones Paidós 
Ibérica. Barcelona. 
HONNETH, A., (1996) The struggle for recognition: the moral grammar of  social conflicts. MIT Press. Web 
available:  
http://books.google.com/books?id=VgdFeCSlJcoC&lpg=PP1&dq=axel%20honneth&hl=es&pg=PR13#v=
onepage&q=&f=true 
IAÑEZ DOMÍNGUEZ, A. (2009) Prisioneros del cuerpo. La construcción social de la diversidad funcional. 
Diversitas Ediciones. Vedra (A Coruña).  
 21 
JAKOBSEN, J.R. (1998) “Working alliances and the politics of  difference: diversity and feminist ethics”. 
Web available: http://books.google.es/books?id=VZ6rfLJ-pGIC&lpg=PA1&ots=Cquv-
0nsUG&dq=future%20ethics%20diversity%20recognition&lr=&pg=PA4#v=onepage&q=&f=false 
KITTAY, E. F (1999) Love’s labor: essays on women, equality, and dependency. Routledge. New York. US.  
KYMLICKA, W. (1992) Multicultural citizenship: a liberal theory of  minority rights. Oxford University Press. 
New York. Web available:   
http://books.google.es/books?hl=es&lr=&id=eiRqsXrJo1UC&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&dq=multiculturalism&ots
=YGBwRAoMnn&sig=k6H7Ois1iUvj25gzOu-Zy0L_b7A#v=onepage&q=multiculturalism&f=false 
MCBRYDE JOHNSON, H. (2003) “Unspeakable Conversations”. New York Times. February 16, 2003. 
Web available:  http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/16/magazine/unspeakable-
conversations.html 
NODDINGS, N. (1984) Caring. A femenine Approach to Ethics & Moral Education. University of  California 
Press. Berkeley and Los Angeles. California. 
NUSSBAUM, M. C. (2006) La fronteras de la justicia. Consideraciones sobre la exclusión. Ediciones Paidós 
Ibérica. 2007. 
OLIVER, M. (1983) Social work with disabled people. Macmillan. Basinstoke.  
PALACIOS, A. (2008) “El modelo social de discapacidad: orígenes, caracterización y plasmación en la 
Convención Internacional sobre los Derechos de las Personas con Discapacidad”. Web available:
  
http://www.convenciondiscapacidad.es/Publicaciones/El%20modelo%20social%20de%20discapacidad.pdf 
PEASE, B., FOOK, J. (1999) Transforming social work practice: post-modern critical perspectives. Routledge. 
London. Digital edition: Taylor & Francis. 2004. Web available:  
http://books.google.es/books?hl=es&lr=&id=bi5kpDa-TpAC&oi=fnd&pg=RA1-
PA57&dq=diversity+ethics&ots=tvS2FIcSOI&sig=vz46PhAKXecWc1c1-
EnIhJrkTZU#v=onepage&q=diversity%20ethics&f=false 
RAWLS J. (1971) Theory of  Justice, Cambridge (Mass.), Belknap Press of  Harvard University Press; tr. sp. 
Teoría de la justicia, Fondo de Cultura Económica, Madrid, 1979. 
ROBERTS, M. A. (2002) “A New Way of  Doing the Best That We Can: Person-Based Consequentialism 
and the Equality Problem”. Ethics, vol. 112, n° 2, (Jan., 2002), pp. 315-350. 
ROMAÑACH, J., LOBATO, M. (2005) “Diversidad funcional, un nuevo término para la lucha por la 
dignidad del ser humano”. Web available:  
http://www.asoc-ies.org/vidaindepen/docs/diversidad%20funcional_vf.pdf 
ROMAÑACH CABRERO, J. (2005) “Los errores sutiles del caso Ramón Sampedro”, in Revista Cuenta 
y Razón del pensamiento actual. nº 135-Invierno 2004/2005, p. 73-89. Web available: 
http://www.cuentayrazon.org/revista/doc/135/Num135_009.doc 
-- (2009) Bioética al otro lado del espejo. Diversitas. Web available: http://diversocracia.org/ideateca.htm#libros 
ROMAÑACH, J, PALACIOS, A. (2007) “Diversity approach: a new view on bioethics from the 
functionally diverse (disabled) people”. Web available:  
http://diversocracia.org/docs/Diversity_approach_overview.doc 
ROMAÑACH, J., PALACIOS, A., FERREIRA, M. A. V., FERRANTE, C. (2009) “Functional 
 22 
Diversity, Bioethics and Sociological Theory: a New Approach to Disability”. Discatif. Sociology on 
Disabilities. Praxis de la DISCApacidad: Teoría, Investigación y Formación. Web available: 
http://www.um.es/discatif/Teoria.htm 
ROUSSEAU, J. J. (1762) Contrat social, in Œuvres complètes, vol. III, Paris, Gallimard, 1964, “La Pléiade” 
series; tr. en. The social contract or principles of  political right. Web available: 
http://www.constitution.org/jjr/socon_01.htm#005 
SEN, A. (2009) The idea of  justice. Allen Lane éd. Web available:  
http://books.google.com/books?id=enqMd_ze6RMC&printsec=frontcover&dq=amartya+sen&hl=es&cd=
7#v=onepage&q&f=false 
SHAPIRO, J. (1994) No Pity: People with Disabilities Forging a New Civil Rights Movement, Times Books, 
Random House, New York. 
SINGER, P. (2002) Unsanctifying human life: essays on ethics. Helga Khuse (ed.). Blackwell. Oxford (UK).  
-- (2002). Desacralizar la vida humana. Ensayos de Ética. Colección Teorema. Cátedra. Madrid. 2003. 
Spanish translation of  P. SINGER, Unsanctifying human life. 
STRUHL, K.J. (2006) “Is Global ethics possible?”, in Tigranovna Stepaniants M. (ed.), Comparative ethics in 
a global age. Web available: http://books.google.es/books?id=QRZ-
P7VOqAQC&pg=PT138&dq=defending+diversity&as_brr=1&cd=4#v=onepage&q=defending%20diversi
ty&f=false  
TOBOSO, M., GUZMÁN, F. (2009) “Cuerpos, capacidades, exigencias funcionales... y otros lechos de 
Procusto. Bodies, Abilities, Functional Requirements...and Others Procrustean Beds”, in Política y 
Sociedad. vol 47, n° 1. Monografía: Por una sociología de la discapacidad. Universidad Complutense de 
Madrid. 2010. Web available:  
http://digital.csic.es/bitstream/10261/23424/1/Toboso%20y%20Guzm%C3%A1n_SIEG%20I%20Cong
reso%202009.pdf 
UNESCO (2005). “Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights”. Web available: 
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=31058&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html 
UNITED NATIONS (1948). “Universal Declaration of  Human Rights” 
-- (2006). “Convention on the Rights of  Persons with Disabilities”. Web available: 
http://www.un.org/disabilities/documents/convention/convoptprot-e.pdf 
 
